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Abstract:  This paper reports the results of the first experiment in the United States designed 
to distinguish two sources of ambiguity: imprecise ambiguity (expert groups agree on a range 
of probability, but not on any point estimate) versus conflict ambiguity (each expert group 
provides precise probability estimates which differ from one group to another). The specific 
context is whether risk professionals (here, insurers) behave differently under risk and 
different types of ambiguity when pricing catastrophic risks (floods and hurricanes) and non-
catastrophic risks (home fires).  The data show that insurers charge higher premiums when 
faced with ambiguity than when the probability of a loss is well specified (risk). Furthermore, 
they tend to charge more for conflict ambiguity than imprecise ambiguity for flood and 
hurricane hazards, but less in the case of fire.  The source of ambiguity also impacts causal 
inferences insurers make to reduce their uncertainty.  
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Introduction  
Since Ellsberg (1961), there have been important research developments in the 
economic and decision sciences literature on the impact that ambiguity — that is, uncertainty 
about probability – can have on how individuals make their decisions (Camerer and Weber 
1992).  Recent papers demonstrate a growing interest in better understanding how ambiguity 
affects choices in the experimental literature on decision-making (Viscusi and Magat 1992; 
Du and Budescu 2005; Hey et al. 2010; Rubaltelli et al. 2010), the formal decision science 
literature (Abdellaoui et al. 2010; Gajdos et al. 2008; Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002; 
Klibanoff et al. 2005; Machina 2009; Mukerji, 2003; Neilson 2010; Seo 2009; Snow 2010), 
and neuro-economics (Chew et al. 2008; Levy et al. 2010). 
This research reveals that attitudes to ambiguity are more complex than originally 
conjectured by Ellsberg (1961) and that the domain of outcomes (loss or gain) and the level 
of probability influence individuals’ choices under ambiguity (Camerer and Weber 1992; 
Hogarth and Einhorn 1990; Viscusi and Chesson 1999).  In the domain of insurance on which 
this paper focuses, previous surveys of underwriters and actuaries indicate that insurers are 
ambiguity-averse for low-probability, high-consequence negative events.  In other words, 
they will want to charge higher premiums when there is ambiguity than when the 
probabilities and losses are well-specified (Kunreuther et al. 1995; Cabantous 2007).    
What is less known, however, is whether the nature of the ambiguity also matters. 
Research on decision-making under uncertainty has recently opened this “black box” to study 
the impact of various sources of uncertainty on choices.  For instance, several empirical 
papers have focused on the impact of a specific type of ambiguity, namely disagreement or 
conflict among experts (Baillon et al. 2010; Budescu et al. 2003; Cabantous 2007; Cameron 
2005; Dean and Shepherd 2007; Smithson 1999; Viscusi 1997; Viscusi and Chesson 1999).  
This research reveals that when seeking advice from multiple advisors, individuals are 
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sensitive to whether these experts agree or disagree with each other with respect to a specific 
forecast and/or in their recommendations for actions.3   
This paper builds on this emerging literature to investigate the effect of the two 
different contexts of ambiguity on insurance pricing decisions by sophisticated agents 
(insurers): imprecise (but consensual) ambiguity and conflict ambiguity. To illustrate these 
two conditions, assume that two advisors, A1 and A2, are asked to provide estimates about the 
probability of a given scenario, for instance a Category 3 hurricane hitting the city of New 
Orleans again in the next 50 years.  Under a risk situation, they both agree that the probability 
is, say, 1/2 so there is consensus on a precise probability. Formally, negative risky prospects 
with two outcomes yield outcome x with probability p and outcome y (with 0≥y≥x) with 
probability (1−p). 
Now let us discuss the following two contexts of ambiguity.  The first one occurs 
when the two advisors A1 and A2 end up with a probability interval rather than a precise 
estimate.  Furthermore, their two intervals are identical.  For instance, they both think the 
probability interval is [1/4; 3/4]. This is a case of consensus but where there is an imprecise 
estimate.  We call such a situation imprecise ambiguity.  Formally, imprecise ambiguity 
prospects give x with a probability that belongs to the interval [p−r, p+r] with r ≤ p ≤ 1−r.  
and y (with 0≥y≥x) otherwise.  Conflict ambiguity occurs when both advisors A1 and A2 
provide a precise point estimate but the two probabilities differ from each other (this could 
also be two different ranges of probabilities, but we will not discuss this case in this paper).  
For instance, A1 strongly believes that the hurricane will occur with probability 1/4 and A2 
                                                 
3 Formal models of aggregation of beliefs with conflicting probability estimates are proposed in Cres et al. 
(2010); Gajdos and Vergnaud (2009); Gollier (2007). 
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strongly believes it will happen with a probability 3/4.4  Formally, conflict ambiguity 
prospects give x with a probability of either (p−r) or (p+r) and y (with 0≥y≥x) otherwise (r is 
fixed and strictly positive). 
Table 1 summarizes these three cases for the above example.  
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
In this paper, we compare insurance pricing in these three contexts in which 
information structure differs.  Our focus is on professional insurers confronted with events 
that have low probabilities but which can generate catastrophic losses if they occur.  We 
study decision contexts where actuaries and underwriters in insurance companies seek advice 
and request probability forecasts from different groups of experts.  Are insurance prices that 
insurers would like to charge different under these three contexts?  Is imprecise knowledge 
better than conflicting expertise in that insurers will ask a lower price for the former than they 
would for the latter? 
We are also interested in the effect of these two sources of ambiguity on cognition.  
To understand how cognition impacts attitudes towards ambiguous risks and actual choices 
we use insights from attribution theory (Hilton and Slugoski 1986; Hilton et al. 1995).  
Although several authors have highlighted the role of attributional explanations in attitudes 
toward ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Heath and Tversky 1991; Taylor 1995), to our 
knowledge no study has explored how causal attribution for analysts’ expressions of 
uncertainty (consensual or conflicting) is utilized by expert insurers to make decisions.   
                                                 
4 See Cabantous (2007), Gajdos and Vergnaud (2009), Smithson (1999) for further discussion on these three 
contexts. Our example is such that the risk situation (probability1/2) is the mean of the interval boundaries (1/4 
and 3/4) but this does not have to be.  
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Our experiment shows that risk professionals (here, insurers) behave differently when 
the probability of the loss is well specified (risk), versus under different types of ambiguity.  
Specifically, we find that insurers charge higher premiums when faced with ambiguity than 
when faced with risk.  Across three hazards (floods, hurricanes, house fires), we find that on 
average, insurers report that for ambiguous damages, they would charge premiums for a one-
year contract that are between 25 percent and 30 percent higher than the premiums they 
would charge for risky damages.  Furthermore, they would likely charge more for conflict 
ambiguity than imprecise ambiguity for flood and hurricane hazards (8.5 percent and 13.9 
percent more for a one-year contract, respectively), but less so in the case of fire (8.3 percent 
less for a one-year contract), probably because they see much less ambiguity in probabilities 
concerning typical house fires.  Normally, they have considerable data on this risk so the 
probability is well-specified.  We also find that the type of ambiguity impacts on the nature of 
the causal inferences insurers make to reduce their uncertainty.  
 
1.  Predictions and literature review  
In this section we specify a set of hypotheses (H) and provide support for each of them by 
reviewing the relevant literature.  
1.1. Insurers are ambiguity-averse for low-probability, high-consequence events (H1) 
If insurers are averse to ambiguity with respect to low-probability, high-consequence 
events whose occurrence is external to the insurers’ actions, they will want to charge higher 
premiums when there is uncertainty about the probability of a loss than when the probability 
is well-specified.  This prediction is consistent with past studies on ambiguity avoidance 
(Camerer and Weber 1992; Hogarth and Einhorn 1990; Viscusi and Chesson 1999), including 
studies of how insurance underwriters and actuaries make decisions about the price they will 
charge for providing insurance coverage.  Kunreuther et al. (1995) show that underwriters 
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report they would charge higher premiums to insure against damages with ambiguous 
probabilities than for damages with precisely-known probabilities (see also Hogarth and 
Kunreuther 1989; Cabantous 2007). 
An explanation for this ambiguity aversion is that individuals avoid situations where 
they do not have information they think others might have (Frisch and Baron 1988).  In a 
similar vein, Heath and Tversky (1991) show that ambiguity avoidance comes from a 
“feeling of incompetence” when decision makers perceived that they have insufficient 
knowledge about a specific event.  Below, we use models of attribution to explore the kinds 
of inferences insurers make by proposing an extension and test of Smithson’s (1999) 
cognitive explanation of conflict aversion.  Attribution theory has been applied to 
understanding how people cope with uncertainty (e.g., McClure et al. 2001) but few studies 
have used it to understand people’s attitudes to ambiguity. Heath and Tversky (1991) and 
Taylor (1995), for example, link ambiguity aversion to attributions of credit and blame, but 
they do not study the causal attributions individuals make when they face uncertain events.   
 
1.2.Insurers prefer imprecise ambiguity over conflict ambiguity (H2) 
Our second hypothesis is that insurers will want to charge a higher premium under 
conflict ambiguity than under imprecise ambiguity.  Smithson (1999) shows that the 
preference for imprecise ambiguity over conflict ambiguity comes from a cognitive heuristic 
that leads decision makers to think that conflicting advisors are less credible and trustworthy 
than consensual (yet imprecise) advisors.  This prediction is also consistent with Cabantous 
(2007) that studies conflict aversion of French actuaries.  One of the reasons that insurers 
would prefer imprecise ambiguity over situations of conflict ambiguity is that conflict is 
likely to be seen as an indicator of lack of competence on the part of at least one of the 
advisors.  This leads us to want to test two other hypotheses, H3 and H4.  
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1.3. Insurers normally expect convergent and precise estimates from their advisors (H3) 
Attribution theory has shown that people often make causal inferences by contrasting 
the current situation to their “world knowledge about the normal state of affairs holding in the 
world” (Hilton and Slugoski 1986).  This means that individuals are more likely to engage in 
attributional thinking when a situation departs from what they expected to face (Weiner 
1985).  We expect that professional insurers are used to the standard case where relevant 
actuarial data exists on the event they cover and that two expert advisors would most likely 
agree on a point prediction. This is known as the “experts-should-converge” hypothesis 
(Shanteau 2001).  Consequently, they will find both kinds of ambiguity in predictions less 
normal than the standard risk case of perfect convergence of precise estimates.   
 
1.4. Insurers will attribute conflicting estimates to less credible and trustworthy advisors 
(internal factors) but consensual imprecision to task difficulty (external factors) (H4).  
In the framework of classic attribution theory, an event is said to be “explained” when 
individuals have identified a characteristic of some involved person (internal factor), situation 
or occasion (external factors) which has produced it (Kelley 1973).  Attributing an event to 
some person, situation or occasion factors depends on the configuration of consensus, 
distinctiveness and consistency information available (see Hilton 2007 for a review).   
Applying standard attributional logic to the case of insurance professionals results in 
the following predictions.  First, in the case of conflicting advice from experts, the low 
consensus between experts will prompt the attributional inference that at least one of the 
advisors is wrong and is thus perceived as being “incompetent” (Hilton et al. 1995).  This is 
precisely the basis for testing the first prediction of hypothesis H4, which states that under the 
conflict ambiguity case, the responders will attribute the conflicting forecasts to the 
incompetence of (at least one of) their advisors as compared to the standard risk case where 
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the experts’ point predictions converge.  The second prediction of H4 is that in the case of 
imprecise ambiguity, compared to the standard risk case, insurers are more likely to attribute 
the ambiguity not to incompetence, but to an external effect such as the difficulty of the 
judgmental task.  This is because the high consensus between expert advisors implies that 
insurers, who receive imprecise but consensual forecasts, are more likely to identify 
something unusual about the task in question, such as the inherent difficulty of modeling 
catastrophe risks for which reliable large-scale actuarial data might not exist.   
 
2.  An experiment studying U.S. underwriters and actuaries’ behavior under risk, 
imprecise ambiguity, and conflict ambiguity 
We tested these predictions in an experiment using a non-standard participant pool (insurers 
who are experts in decision-making under uncertainty) with a field context (insurance pricing 
task) involving three hazards (flood, hurricane, fire).  Specifically, we created a web-based 
questionnaire asking insurers what premiums they would charge a representative client under 
different situations of uncertainty (namely risk, imprecise ambiguity and conflict ambiguity) 
and their causal understanding of the situation (i.e., reasons why the probability is not well 
specified by the experts they have turned to for advice).   
 
2.1. Stimulus 
The three different kinds of hazards were crossed with three sources of uncertainty: 
risk, imprecise ambiguity and conflict ambiguity, leading to nine possible scenarios. The 
responders were given probability estimates from two different risk modeling companies 
(“advisors” hereafter) to estimate the probability of each one of these three hazards.  
As discussed in the introduction, in the case of risk, both advisors agreed on the same 
probability. In the imprecise ambiguity case, neither of the advisors provided a precise 
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probability estimate but both converged on the exact same range of probabilities.  In the 
conflict ambiguity case, each advisor provided a point estimate of the probability of the pre-
defined damage and amount of insurance claims, but the two likelihood estimates were 
different. Table 2 depicts the scenarios utilized in the experiment.  
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
These scenarios are similar to the ones used in previous studies on insurers’ attitudes 
to ambiguity (Cabantous 2007; De Marcellis 2000; Kunreuther et al. 1995).  All the insurers 
who participated in the experiment were asked to imagine that they were employed by an 
insurance company that “provides coverage to 1,000 homeowners in an area that has the 
possibility of [flood/hurricane/fire] damage.”  They were also told that “The value of each 
home in this area is $200,000.  If a [flood/hurricane/fire] occurs and severely damages a 
home it will cause $100,000 in insurance claims (above the deductible).” (It is therefore 
known that the amount of the payment the insurance company will have to make if the event 
occurs is $100,000 per house).  In the case of flood damage, which is provided in the United 
States mainly by the government-run National Flood Insurance Program, we also told the 
insurers to “Imagine that the current federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) no 
longer exists and that flood insurance is offered to homeowners in the private market.”5 In 
this context, their company would also be paying for losses associated with the flood 
scenario.  
Insurers who participated in the survey were asked to base their estimates of the 
probability of damage on the figures provided by their advisors, the two modeling firms with 
                                                 
5 See Michel-Kerjan (2010) for an analysis of the operation of this program. 
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whom they usually work.6  The probability of damage was set at 1 percent in the risky case, 
and the range between 0.5 percent and 2 percent in the imprecise ambiguity case.  The 
probability estimate in the risky context was thus the geometrical mean of the two bounds of 
the probability range.  In the conflict ambiguity case, one risk-modeling firm estimated that 
the probability of the damage was 0.5 percent whereas the other estimated it was 2 percent.7 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the three cases.  
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
2.2. Experiment questions  
As we were interested in pricing behavior (see H1 and H2), we asked participants to 
provide the “pure premiums” they would charge.  These pure premiums exclude the other 
costs the insurance company would incur and want to pass on to its policyholders, such as 
administrative and marketing costs, loss assessment costs and the opportunity cost associated 
with capital that insurers need to hold to satisfy rating agencies’ and regulatory solvency 
requirements.  Insurers were asked to indicate the minimum pure premium they would charge 
to provide a 1-year full insurance coverage contract against the specific untoward event, and 
the annual premium for a 20-year full insurance coverage contract.   
                                                 
6 We could have used two qualitatively different advisors, like a risk modeling firm and the internal technical 
team of the insurance company.  However, because the study focuses on situations where no a priori 
information about the reliability of the advisors is available, we used two similar advisors.  If we had introduced 
a risk modeling firm and an internal team of experts, the participants would have been less likely to consider 
that the two sources of information were a priori equally reliable.   
7 The geometric mean in this case is (0.5x2)½ = 1%. In section 3 we compare the premiums that insurers would 
charge with actuarially-priced insurance under arithmetic mean of the probability interval (1.25%); where equal 
weight is given to the two estimates (conflict) and the interval frontiers (imprecise).  
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We were interested in how these insurers would react to a multi-year contract because 
there have been recent proposals to modify insurance contracts in that direction so as to 
provide more stability to the policyholders over time and reduce administrative cost for the 
insurer.8  Here, multi-year insurance keeps the annual insurance premium the same over a 
fixed time horizon.  To test hypothesis H3 we included a question about insurers’ perceptions 
of the degree of “unusualness” of the probability estimates that they were given (see question 
2 in appendix 1).    
To test hypothesis H4, two causal attributions were linked to the advisors (person 
causal attribution) and one to the task performed by the advisors (situation causal attribution). 
One question on causal attribution was positive (“Both modeling firms did their work very 
well.”; see question 3 in appendix 1) and another was negative, implying incompetence (“At 
least one of the modeling firms did not do its work very well.”; see question 4 in appendix 1).  
Another question also concerned the perception of the competence of the advisors (question 
6: “To what extent do you have the impression that the two modeling firms are both 
competent in estimating the probability of the [flood/hurricane/fire] damage in this case?).  
Question 5 concerned the difficulty of the task: “How strongly do you agree with the 
following statement?: “Estimating the probability of the [flood/hurricane/fire] damage in this 
case is a highly difficult task.” 
After the participants had read the three scenarios and completed the series of 
questions, we asked several socio-demographic questions (sex, age, training, and experience) 
and queried about the insurance company they worked for (number of employees, 
surplus/capital and type of the company).  Appendix 1 provides the full list of questions from 
                                                 
8 For more details on the structure of a multi-year policy see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009), Jaffee, 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2011). 
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the web-based questionnaire, and appendix 2 provides socio-demographics of participants 
and their company.  
 
2.3. Sampling plan  
To reduce the number of scenarios given to each participant, we used a Latin-square 
design and participants were randomly assigned to three of the nine scenarios.  The computer 
program ensured that each participant was exposed to only one hazard (flood, hurricane or 
fire) that was associated with only one source of uncertainty (risk, conflict ambiguity or 
imprecise ambiguity).  For example a participant could be exposed to “Fire damage in the 
conflict ambiguity context,” “Flood damage in the imprecise ambiguity context” and 
“Hurricane damage in the risky context.”  The order of presentation of the scenarios was 
randomized.   
 
2.4. Insurers participating in the study  
The survey was available online on a dedicated website and required a password.  
Participants in a pilot study reported that the instrument was user-friendly and that the survey 
did not take them more than fifteen minutes to complete.9   
All the responders were from insurance companies operating in the United States. 
Nearly two-thirds of them were actuaries and the rest either underwriters, risk managers, or at 
other management positions.  The computer treatment of the data assured the anonymity of 
the answers.  We obtained 84 responses, four of which were eliminated because the 
individuals did not fully complete the questionnaire.  The number of responses is consistent 
                                                 
9 Two insurance trade associations announced the existence of this survey to their members. Because of the way 
it was made available to all their members without being sent individually to each one of them, it is difficult to 
determine the response rate.   
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with other studies.10  Of the 80 participants, 58 (72.5%) were males and 22 (22.5%) females.  
The majority of participants were in their 20s and 30s (27.5% and 35% respectively); one-
fourth were in their 40s (23.75%) and 13.75% in their 50s.  A majority of answers came from 
publicly-traded insurers (56.25%) and mutual insurance companies (33.75%).  More than half 
of the participants were working for large companies, those with a policyholders’ surplus in 
the $5 billion and $10 billion range and with a number of employees ranging from 5,000 to 
20,000 (see appendix 2 for more details).  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
Table 3a below reports the geometric means11 and median values of pure premiums 
for the main experimental conditions.  Mean and median pure premiums are always higher 
for all three hazards than the expected loss of $1,000 (i.e. 1% annual chance of losing 
$100,000).  This is consistent with findings from previous studies that show that insurers are 
risk averse.  
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3a ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                 
10 For example, Ho et al. (2005) report the results of a series of experiments conducted with a total of 92 
participants (30 managers in Experiment 1, and 62 participants in Experiment 2).  In another paper published in 
2002, the same authors ran an experiment with a total of 79 MBA students (39 MBA students in Experiment 1, 
and 40 MBA students in Experiment 2).   
11 Descriptive statistics revealed that the premium distributions violated the normality assumption (skewness 
coefficient = 2.98 and 6.82 for the 1-year contract and the 20-year contract respectively).  We therefore 
performed a log transformation (skewness coefficient = 0.53 and 0.76 for the log(1yP) and log(20yP) 
respectively). Such a procedure allows counteracting the effect of outliers and is useful when the distribution of 
the dependent variable is highly skewed (see Kunreuther et al. 1995 for a similar analysis). In the subsequent 
analysis, we use the log (Premium/EL) as our main dependent variable.   
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3.1. Ambiguity aversion hypothesis (H1) 
To test H1, we compared the premiums under risk with those under both types of 
ambiguity.  Table 3a shows that, on average across natural hazards, the mean premiums for 
one year contracts for imprecise ambiguouity are 25 percent higher than the mean premiums 
for risky damages; they are 30 percent higher for conflict ambiguity than for risky damages.12  
(Median premiums for ambiguous damages under one year contracts ranged from 50 percent 
to 92.5 percent higher than for risky damages).  This suggests that insurers are averse to both 
types of ambiguity. 
To formally test this ambiguity aversion we undertook a Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA) on the log premiums charged for the 1-year and the 20-year contracts, 
and determined the main effects of each of three fixed factors: Source of Uncertainty, Natural 
Hazard and Participant ID.13  We found that the premiums under imprecise ambiguity are 
significantly higher than premiums under risk (F=14.62, p=0.000 and F=10.74, p=0.002 for 
1-year contracts and 20-year contracts respectively).  In other words, imprecise ambiguity 
significantly increases the premiums insurers indicated they would charge to insure against 
the damage.  We also found that premiums under conflict ambiguity are significantly higher 
than premiums under risk (F=22.45, p=0.000 and F=16.29, p=0.000 for the 1-year and the 20-
year contracts respectively).  These results indicate that H1 holds, i.e., insurers are indeed 
averse to both types of ambiguity.  
Although we computed our results using the geometric mean, we are also aware that 
some insurers might have considered using the arithmetic mean of the two expert estimates 
                                                 
12 Specifically, 41 (51.25%) participants charged simultaneously a smaller premium under risk than under 
imprecise ambiguity, and a smaller premium under risk than under conflict ambiguity. Sixteen (20%) 
participants charged a higher premium under one source of ambiguity than under risk.  
13 In the text, we report the main effect of the Natural Hazard factor only when it was significant. 
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rather than the geometric mean.  We thus also computed the risk premium for each response 
under risk, imprecise ambiguity and conflict ambiguity (Table 3b).  In the case of risk, the 
risk premium (RP) is the difference between the pure premium and the expected loss (i.e., 
$1,000).  For the two types of ambiguity, we calculated the risk premium (RP) as the 
difference between the pure premium and the arithmetic mean of the expected losses; that is 
$1,125 ($1,000*0.5*(0.02+0.005)).  
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3b ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table 3b presents the means and medians of the risk premium (RP) distributions, by 
hazard and by source of uncertainty.  We can see that mean risk premiums under imprecise 
ambiguity and conflict ambiguity are higher than risk premiums under risk when insurers sell 
the standard one-year contracts.  We ran similar statistical analysis on the risk premiums 
distributions (mean) as we did on the mean log premiums in Table 3a.  These tests shows that 
insurers charge significantly higher RP under imprecise ambiguity than under risk (F=11.388, 
p=0.001 for one-year contracts; F=4.354, p=0.040 for 20-year contracts); and under conflict 
ambiguity than under risk (F=12.504, p=0.001 for one-year contracts; F=2.848, p=0.048 – 
one sided test – for 20-year contracts).  These results confirm that insurers are ambiguity 
averse, and that H1 is supported. 
 
3.2. Conflict aversion hypothesis (H2) 
To test H2 we restricted our analysis to the imprecise ambiguity and conflict 
ambiguity contexts and performed a MANOVA on the log premiums with Source of 
Uncertainty, Natural Hazard and Participant ID as fixed factors.  Looking at all three hazards 
combined, participants said they would charge premiums between 2.7 percent and 4.5 percent 
higher under conflict ambiguity than under imprecise ambiguity (for the 20-year and 1-year 
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contracts, respectively; Table 3a).  This suggests a tendency for conflict aversion, but this 
difference was not large enough to be statistically significant (F=0.58, p=0.45 and F=0.19, 
p=0.66 for 1-year and 20-year contracts respectively) so that H2 was not supported.14   
We also examined whether insurers assessed the three types of hazard differently.  To 
do so, we ran three MANOVAs (one for each hazard), with Source of Uncertainty as a fixed 
factor, and asked for simple contrasts in order to compare the premiums charged under 
imprecise ambiguity with those charged under conflict ambiguity.  When the data were 
disaggregated, we found that, contrary to what we predicted, for the fire hazard insurers 
charged smaller premiums under conflict ambiguity than under imprecise ambiguity (8.3 
percent and 29.4 percent smaller for the 1-year and 20-year contracts, respectively; Table 3a).  
These contrasts are significant for both the 1-year premiums (p=0.049) and the 20-year 
premiums (p=0.013).  For the two other hazards however, we observed the predicted trend.  
Insurers charged on average more under conflict ambiguity than under imprecise ambiguity 
for flood (8.5 percent and 30.4 percent higher for the 1-year and 20-year contracts, 
respectively), and for hurricane (13.9 percent and 16.3 percent higher for the 1-year and 20-
year contracts, respectively) but none of these contrasts are statistically significant (Table 3a). 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that the same pattern was obtained when the responders were asked about the level of 
confidence they had in their estimates of the premium (see question 8 in appendix 1). A MANOVA on 
confidence scores across all respondents revealed that insurers were much more confident in their decisions 
under risk (3.55 and 3.15) than under imprecise ambiguity (3.11and 2.89) (F=11.22, p=0.001 and F=16.34, p = 
0.000 for 1-year and 20-year premiums, respectively); and under risk than under conflict ambiguity (3.16 and 
2.79) (F=6.55, p = 0.012; and F=9.37, p = 0.003 for 1-year and 20-year premiums, respectively).  In addition, 
we did not find any statistically significant difference between the confidence scores under imprecise ambiguity 
and conflict ambiguity (F=0.24, p = 0.63 and F=0.07, p = 0.79 for the 1-year and 20-year premiums, 
respectively).   
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These results suggest that the nature of the hazard matters, even though the expected loss is 
the same for each one of these three hazard scenarios.  
There might be several reasons for this behavior.  It might be due to the potential for 
truly catastrophic losses from hurricanes and floods.  Of the twenty-five most costly insured 
disasters that occurred in the world between 1970 and 2010, twenty-two of them were 
hurricanes and floods.  Moreover, when we ran this experiment in 2008, seven major 
hurricanes had made landfall in the U.S. in 2004 and 2005, including Hurricane Katrina 
which inflicted over $150 billion in economic losses, $48 billion of which was borne by 
private insurers (2008 prices) (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009).  In contrast, with the 
exception of large-scale wild fires such as those in Russia during the summer of 2010, events 
resulting in insurance losses for house fires tend to be relatively small in size.   
Another explanation relates to the available data for estimating the likelihood of these 
three different hazards.  After the seven major hurricanes of 2004 and 2005, some risk 
modeling firms and insurers revised their catastrophe models to reflect a potential increase in 
climate-related risk.  In contrast, insurers typically have large historical database for house 
fires from their own claims and from engineering studies to improve building safety.  
 
3.3. Insurers normally expect convergent and precise estimates from their advisors (H3) 
We now turn to testing H3 which predicts that insurers expect a priori the two risk-
modeling firms to provide the same precise probability (normal condition).  To test this 
prediction, we asked the surveyed insurers “To what extent do you have the impression that 
there is there something unusual about the estimates of the probability of the damage you 
have been given?” (question 2 in appendix 1).  Answers were given on a 7-point scale 
ranging from -3 “nothing unusual” to +3 “extremely unusual.”  This scale captures the degree 
of “unusualness” of the decision context.  We transformed this scale into a 3-point scale 
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ranging from 1 “nothing unusual” (old scores -3, -2, -1), to 2 “neutral” (old score 0), and 3 
“something unusual” (old scores +1, +2, +3).  Table 4 gives the frequencies of answers (and 
percentage) to the unusualness question by type of hazards.   
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
We can also look at the results by type of hazards.  For each hazard, we ran a series of 
two-way Chi-square tests to determine whether the distribution of answers to the 
“unusualness” question under risk was different from the distributions of answers under 
imprecise ambiguity, and under conflict ambiguity.  For fire, we found that these differences 
were highly significant both for the comparison between risk and imprecise ambiguity 
(Cramer’s V=0.428, p = 0.007) and for the comparison between risk and conflict ambiguity 
(Cramer’s V = 0.576, p = 0.000).  Specifically, Table 4 shows that under risk, a large 
majority of insurers (70 percent) said that there was “nothing unusual” about the estimates of 
the probability of the damage they were given, whereas only a minority of insurers exposed 
to the imprecise ambiguity context (28 percent) and to the conflict ambiguity context (20 
percent) considered this to be the case.  In other words, insurers exposed to the fire scenario 
said that they were expecting the two-risk modeling firms to come up with the same precise 
probability, as H3 predicts.  
For flood, we did not find any significant difference between the distributions of 
answers to the unusualness question under risk and imprecision ambiguity (Cramer’s V = 
0.042, p = 1), and under risk and conflict ambiguity (Cramer’s V = 0.177, p = 0.426).  This 
means that H3 is not supported.  Yet, Table 4 shows that the distribution of the perception of 
unusualness under risk and imprecise ambiguity are highly similar (52 percent, 16 percent 
and 32 percent; and 50 percent, 19 percent and 31 percent, respectively).  Although 
perceptions of unusualness under risk and conflict ambiguity are not significantly different, 
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Table 4 thus shows that we observed the expected trend.  The proportion of “neutral” answers 
is similar under risk and conflict ambiguity (16 percent and 21 percent, respectively) but, 
under risk, a large proportion of insurers (52 percent) considered that there was “nothing 
unusual” about the probability estimates they were given; whereas under conflict ambiguity, a 
large proportion of insurers (45 percent) said that there was “something unusual” about the 
probability estimates.  Taken all together, these results suggest that insurers exposed to the 
flood scenario tended to expect the two modeling firms to come up with the same precise 
probability estimate (or the same imprecise probability) and did not expect them to disagree 
on the probability of the damage.  
For hurricane, we also found that H3 was not supported by the data.  The series of 2-
way Chi-square tests showed that the distributions of answers to the unusualness question 
under risk did not differ from the distributions of answers under imprecise ambiguity 
(Cramer’s V = 0.199, p = 0.36), and under conflict ambiguity (Cramer’s V = 0.120, p = 0.72).   
 
3.4. Conflict imprecision leads to person attribution whereas imprecise ambiguity leads to 
task attribution (H4) 
Finally, we test the H4 predictions.  The abnormal conditions focus model of causal 
attribution (Hilton and Slugoski 1986) contends that due to low consensus (disagreement 
between advisors), insurers will attribute conflict ambiguity to the incompetence of their 
advisors and perceive their advisors to be less credible and trustworthy than in cases of high 
consensus where the advisors agree.  On the other hand, the same causal attribution model 
contends that when expert advisors provide similar but imprecise estimates of the probability 
of an event, insurers will attribute the imprecise ambiguity to the difficulty of the task.   
Based on this causal attribution model, we made the following two predictions (H4).  
First, we predicted that under the conflict ambiguity case, the insurers will attribute the 
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uncertainty they face to the incompetence of (at least one of) their advisors compared to the 
standard risk case.  Second, we predicted that in the case of imprecise ambiguity, compared to 
the standard risk case, insurers will be more likely to attribute the uncertainty they face to the 
difficulty of the task.  
First, to test whether conflict ambiguity generates doubt about the advisors’ 
competence compared to risk, we focused on the comparison between the two.  For each 
hazard, we run a series of two-way Chi-square tests, one for each of the two person 
attribution questions (questions 3 and 4 in appendix 1) and one for the competence question 
(question 6 in appendix 1).  Table 5 shows that for all three hazards, as hypothesized, the 
proportion of insurers considering their advisors to be “competent” was consistently higher in 
the risk context than in the conflict ambiguity context, as evidenced by the percentages that 
are systematically higher under risk – 100 percent, 88 percent and 66 percent – than under 
conflict ambiguity –76 percent, 69 percent, 60 percent (scores are given for flood, hurricane 
and fire, respectively).  A statistical test showed that the distribution of answers to the 
competence question under risk was significantly different from the distribution of answers 
under conflict ambiguity across the three hazards (Cramer’s V = 0.190, p =0.025; one-sided 
test)  This effect, however, was mainly due to results from the fire scenario where the 
difference is significant (Cramer’s V = 0.504, p = 0.000) whereas the effect is not significant 
for flood (Cramer’s V = 0.178, p = 0.58) and hurricane (Cramer’s V = 0.051, p = 1) 
scenarios.  
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
We then looked at the Positive Source attribution question.  As predicted, across 
hazards, insurers were more likely to agree with the statement that their advisors “did their 
work very well” (Positive Source) under risk than under conflict ambiguity (Cramer’s V = 
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0.222, p = 0.022).  This global effect was significant mainly because of the fire scenario, 
where we found that the distribution of answers to the positive source question under risk was 
significantly different from the distribution of answers under conflict ambiguity (Cramer’s V 
= 0.511, p = 0.001).  Thus, in the fire scenario, Table 5 shows for instance that more insurers 
agreed with the positive source statement under risk (57.7 percent) than under conflict 
ambiguity (20 percent).  Conversely, more insurers disagree with the statement under conflict 
ambiguity (52 percent) than under risk (7.7 percent).  In the flood and hurricane scenarios, 
however, even though a larger number of insurers disagreed with the positive statement under 
conflict ambiguity than under risk (17.2 percent versus 8 percent for flood; 31 percent versus 
24 percent for hurricane), a large proportion of insurers opted for the “neutral” answer under 
both conflict ambiguity and risk.  Statistical tests confirmed that the distributions of answers 
to the positive source question under risk and under conflict ambiguity were not statistically 
different (Cramer’s V = 0.175, p = 0.437; Cramer’s V = 0.102, p = 0.786 for flood and 
hurricane respectively).    
When looking at the Negative Source question, across hazards, we found no 
significant difference between the distributions of answers under risk and conflict ambiguity 
(Cramer’s V = 0.166, p = 0.115).  This aggregated result, however, hides the fact that in the 
fire scenario, the difference was significant, and was in the predicted direction (Cramer’s V = 
0.434, p = 0.007).  For instance, Table 5 shows that in the fire scenario, more insurers agreed 
with the statement that “at least one firm did not do its work well” under conflict ambiguity 
(44 percent) than under risk (15 percent).  In the flood scenario, although Table 5 shows that 
the distributions of answers exhibit the predicted pattern – more agreement under conflict 
ambiguity (17 percent) than under risk (4 percent), and more disagreement under risk (48 
percent) than under conflict ambiguity (31 percent) – the effect was not significant (Cramer’s 
V = 0.242, p = 0.244).  This might be due to the fact that in this case, a large proportion of 
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insurers were actually “neutral” under both conflict ambiguity (52 percent) and risk (48 
percent).  In the hurricane scenario, we found no significant difference between the 
distributions of answers to the negative source attribution question under conflict ambiguity 
and risk (Cramer’s V = 0.243, p = 0.205).  
We then tested for the second part of H4, which predicts that insurers will be more 
likely to attribute the uncertainty they face to the difficulty of the task under imprecise 
ambiguity than under risk.  To do so, we compared the distributions of answers to the task 
attribution question under imprecise ambiguity and risk.  As predicted, across hazards, we 
found that the two distributions of answers were different (Cramer’s V = 0.417, p = 0.000).  
Table 5 shows indeed that more insurers agreed with the statement “estimating the 
probability is a highly difficult task” under imprecise ambiguity (69 percent, 85 percent, 92 
percent for fire, flood and hurricane, respectively) than under risk (38 percent, 8 percent, 83 
percent for fire, flood and hurricane, respectively).  The difference between the two 
distributions was significant for fire (Cramer’s V = 0.346, p = 0.041) and for flood (Cramer’s 
V = 0.836, p = 0.000), but not for hurricane (Cramer’s V = 0.140, p = 0.707).   
In sum, both predictions of H4 were supported for the fire scenario, but not for the 
flood and hurricane scenarios. This raises questions about expert insurers’ differing 
expectations concerning these scenarios, which we discuss below.  
 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
Our results provide additional evidence that sophisticated subjects – insurers are 
experts in decision-making under uncertainty – behave as if they are ambiguity-averse in the 
loss domain when faced with the task of pricing risks having a low probability of occurrence 
but potentially catastrophic effects (H1).   
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Furthermore, our results show that the source of ambiguity can have an important 
impact on choices.  When all hazards are combined, our prediction that insurance 
professionals would be more concerned with conflict ambiguity than imprecise ambiguity was 
not confirmed (H2).  But when the data were disaggregated, we found that on average, 
insurers tended to charge higher premiums under conflict ambiguity than under imprecise 
ambiguity for hazards perceived as potentially catastrophic such as floods and hurricanes, but 
lower premiums for non-catastrophic hazards such as house fires.   
We then asked whether this tendency for aversion to conflict came from a cognitive 
heuristic that leads individuals to attribute the cause of conflicting uncertainty to the 
incompetence of their advisors.  If they doubted the quality of their advisors’ estimates, they 
might want to increase the price of coverage by assigning a larger weight to the highest 
probability estimate from the two advisors.  To answer this question, we used attribution 
theory (Hilton and Slugoski 1986; Hilton et al. 1995).  We reasoned that insurers would 
normally expect risk-modeling firms to be in agreement and to communicate a precise 
probability (H3).   
We found that the risky context was perceived as the most usual context for fire, 
whereas conflict ambiguity was rated as the most unusual context.  For hurricane, imprecise 
ambiguity was rated the most usual context, and risk the most unusual.  We believe this is due 
to the nature of hurricane assessment which requires one to use climate models to project 
losses in the future.  The choice of different climate models and slightly different 
assumptions or other elements of the selected model will generate different outcomes.  We 
assumed that insurers will expect consensual and precise probability forecasts from their 
advisors.  We thus predicted that disagreeing advisors will be considered as less credible and 
competent than advisors converging on the same precise estimate. We also predicted that 
imprecise but consensual advisors will not be considered as less credible and competent than 
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advisors converging on the same precise estimate, and that imprecise ambiguity will be 
attributed to the difficulty of the judgmental (H4).  In the fire scenario in particular, we found 
that insurers indeed perceived the risk modeling firms that provided the estimates as being 
less competent under conflicting uncertainty than under risk; and that they were more likely 
to attribute the uncertainty they face to the difficulty of the task under imprecise ambiguity 
than under risk. 
Our data also suggest that expert insurers have strong a priori expectations associated 
with different kinds of hazards which influence their judgments. Indeed, their responses differ 
between a hazard where there is a potential catastrophe (flood and hurricane) and the more 
standard case where the losses are non-catastrophic (fire) where the expected loss is the same 
for each hazard.  These systematic differences suggest that future research should address the 
correspondence between risk and ambiguity domains, availability of actuarial estimates, and 
insurers’ expectations about risk modelers’ predictions.  For example, the expectation that 
experts should converge to precise point estimates may hold only in cases where there is 
enough relevant actuarial data.  If we assume that the experienced insurers in our sample 
know that such actuarial data exists for fire but not for flood and hurricane, this could explain 
why consensus over precise estimates would be seen as a cue to competence only for the fire 
hazard.   
In future research it would also be useful to test whether individuals consider that they 
are less informed when their advisors exhibit conflict ambiguity than imprecise ambiguity.  In 
other words, one could test whether individuals would treat conflict ambiguity as a form of 
“epistemic uncertainty” due to lack of knowledge that could be reduced and imprecise 
ambiguity as “aleatory uncertainty” due to randomness.  In the former case, individuals 
would be better informed if they rely on more competent advisors, whereas in the latter case 
they could not reduce the uncertainty by simply requesting the estimates of more advisors.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Differences between Risk, Imprecise Ambiguity and Conflict Ambiguity 
 Risk Imprecise Ambiguity Conflict Ambiguity 
Advisor A1 ½ [1/4;3/4] ¼ 
Advisor A2 ½ [1/4;3/4] ¾ 
 
Table 2. Scenarios: The Three Sources of Uncertainty 
Source of Uncertainty Implementation  
Risk 
The probability of the risk 
is well established. There is 
a consensus on a precise 
probability. 
You have asked two modeling firms with whom you usually work to 
evaluate the annual probability of a flood severely damaging a home in 
the area. Both modeling firms estimate that there is 1 in 100 chance 
that a flood will severely damage homes in this area this year (i.e., the 
annual probability is 1%).  They both are confident in their estimate.  
Imprecise ambiguity 
There is uncertainty about 
the probability of the risk 
but there is no controversy. 
You have asked two modeling firms with whom you usually work to 
evaluate the annual probability of a hurricane severely damaging a 
home in the area. Both modeling firms recognize it is difficult to 
provide you with a precise probability estimate. The two modeling 
firms however agree that the probability that a hurricane will severely 
damage homes in this area this year ranges somewhere between 1 in 
200 chance and 1 in 50 chance (i.e., they have converged to the same 
0.5% to 2% probability range). 
Conflict ambiguity 
There is controversy about 
the probability of the risk. 
You have asked two modeling firms with whom you usually work to 
evaluate the annual probability of a fire severely damaging a home in 
the area. There is a strong disagreement between the two modeling 
firms.  One modeling firm confidently estimates that there is 1 in 200 
chance that a fire will severely damage homes in this area this year 
(i.e., the annual probability is 0.5%). The other modeling firm 
confidently estimates that the chance that a fire will severely damage 
homes in this area this year is much higher: 1 in 50 chance (i.e., the 
annual probability is 2%). 
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Table 3a. Geometric Mean and Median Pure Premiums in $/Year 
 1-year contract  20-year contract 
 
Risk 
Imprecise 
Ambiguity
Conflict 
Ambiguity
 
Risk
Imprecise 
Ambiguity 
Conflict 
Ambiguity  
Fire        
Geometric Mean 1,137 1,614 1,479 1,076 1,780 1,256
Median 1,000 1,500 1,500  1,000 1,500 1,250 
Flood   
Geometric Mean 1,342 1,620 1,758 1,282 1,450 1,891
Median 1,100 1,500 2,000  1,000 1,600 1,600 
Hurricane   
Geometric Mean 1,369 1,549 1,765 1,583 1,510 1,756
Median 1,100 1,250 1,925  1,025 1,500 2,000 
Total (n=80)   
Geometric Mean 1,281 1,596 1,668 1,307 1,582 1,624
Median 1,000 1,500 1,925  1,000 1,500 1,650 
Table 3b. Mean and Median Risk Premiums in $/Year 
 1-year contract  20-year contract 
 
Risk 
Imprecise 
Ambiguity
Conflict 
Ambiguity
 
Risk
Imprecise 
Ambiguity 
Conflict 
Ambiguity  
Fire        
Mean 672 816 652 320 1988 464
Median 0 375 375 0 375 125
Flood   
Mean 654 1143 959 895 860 2069
Median 100 375 875 0 475 475
Hurricane   
Mean 578 1007 1219 1277 1089 1082
Median 100 125 800 25 375 875
Total (n=80)   
Mean 632 982 948 847 1341 1247
Median 0 375 800 0 375 525
 
Table 4. Distribution of Answers (%) to the Unusualness Question 
 Risk Imprecision Conflict 
Fire   
Nothing unusual 18 (70) 8 (28) 5 (20) 
Neutral 4 (15) 7 (24) 2 (08) 
Something unusual 4 (15) 14 (48) 18 (72) 
Flood   
Nothing unusual 13 (52) 13 (50) 10 (34) 
Neutral 4 (16) 5 (19) 6 (21) 
Something unusual 8 (32) 8 (31) 13 (45) 
Hurricane    
Nothing unusual 10 (34) 12 (48) 8 (31) 
Neutral 4 (14) 5 (20) 6 (23) 
Something unusual 15 (52) 8 (32) 12 (46) 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Answers (%) to the Competence Question and Attribution Questions(a) 
 Fire Flood Hurricane 
 Risk Imprecis. Conflict Risk Imprecis. Conflict Risk Imprecis. Conflict 
Competence: Impression that the two modeling firms are competent in… 
Not competent  0 (0) 2 (7) 1 (04) 2 (08) 0 (0) 3 (10) 3 (10) 2 (8) 2 (8)
Neutral 0 (0) 4 (14) 9 (36) 1 (04) 4 (15) 4 (14) 7 (24) 3 (12) 6 (23)
Competent 26 (100) 23 (79) 15 (60)
22 
(88) 22 (85) 22 (76) 19 (66) 20 (80) 18 (69)
Positive Source : Both modeling firms did their work very well
Do not agree  2 (7.7) 4 (14) 13 (52) 2 (08) 5 (19) 5 (17.2) 7 (24) 5 (20) 8 (31)
Neutral 9 (34.6) 14 (48) 7 (28)
16 
(64) 6 (23) 
14 
(48.3) 14 (48) 9 (36) 10 (38)
Agree  15 (57.7) 11 (38) 5 (20) 7 (28) 15 (58) 
10 
(34.5) 8 (28) 11 (44) 8 (31)
Negative Source: At least one modeling firm did not do its work very well 
Do not agree  16 (62) 10 (34) 5 (20)
12 
(48) 13 (50) 9 (31) 8 (27.6) 12 (48) 13 (50)
Neutral 6 (23) 14 (48) 9 (36)
12 
(48) 7 (27) 15 (52) 15 (51.7) 7 (28) 8 (31)
Agree  4 (15) 5 (17) 11 (44) 1 (04) 6 (23) 5 (17) 6 (20.7) 6 (24) 5 (19)
Task: Estimating the probability of (…) is a highly difficult task 
Do not agree  14 (54) 6 (21) 6 (24)
19 
(76) 0 (0) 0 3 (10) 1 (4) 3 (11.5)
Neutral 2 (08) 3 (10) 2 (08) 4 (16) 4 (15) 0 2 (07) 1 (4) 2 (7.7)
Agree  10 (38) 20 (69) 17 (68) 2 (08) 22 (85) 29 (100) 24 (83) 23 (92) 21 80.8)
(a) As for the unusualness question, answers which were given on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree).  We 
then transformed into 3-point scale ranging from 1 “do not agree” (old scores -3, -2, -1), to 2 “neutral” (old score 0), and 3 “agree” (old scores 
+1, +2, +3).   
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Figure 1. Graphical Representation of Experts’ Judgments in the Experiment 
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APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENT QUESTIONS  
For each scenario, the participants were asked to answer 10 questions, presented in the 
following order:  
1. Perception of disagreement.  We asked participants to answer the question “To what 
extent do you have the impression that the two modeling firms are in agreement on the 
estimate of the probability of the damage?” on a 7-point scale, ranging from -3 = “Not in 
agreement at all” to +3 = “In complete agreement.”  
2. Degree of “unusualness”.  We asked participants to rate on a 7-point scale, ranging from 
-3 = “Nothing unusual at all” to +3 = “Extremely unusual” the degree of “unusualness” 
of the scenario.  The question was: “To what extent do you have the impression that 
there is there something unusual about the estimates of the probability of the damage 
you have been given?”  
3. Positive person attribution.  We asked participants: “How strongly do you agree with the 
following statement? “Both modeling firms did their work, i.e., estimating the probability 
of the [flood/fire/hurricane] damage in this case, very well.” Participants could answer 
this question on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 = “Strongly disagree” to +3 = “Strongly 
agree.” 
4. Negative person attribution.  We asked participants: “How strongly do you agree with 
the following statement? “At least one of the two modeling firms did not do its work, i.e., 
estimating the probability of the [flood/fire/hurricane] damage in this case, very well.”  
We used the same scale as for question 3.  
5. External (Task) attribution. We asked participants: “How strongly do you agree with the 
following statement?: “Estimating the probability of the [flood/fire/hurricane] damage 
in this case is a highly difficult task.” We used the same scale as for question 3. 
6. Perception of the competence of the advisors.  The participants were asked to answer the 
question “To what extent do you have the impression that the two modeling firms are 
both competent in estimating the probability of the [flood/fire/hurricane] damage in this 
case?” on a 7-point scale, ranging from -3 = “Both firms are not competent at all”; 0 = 
“At least one firm is not competent”; +3 = “Both firms are extremely competent.”  
7. Pricing (1-year contract). Participants were told that they had the possibility of offering a 
typical one-year contract.  We asked them to report the “minimum annual premium 
(excluding administrative costs) that they would charge against the risk.” 
8. Confidence (1-year contract).  Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 = “Not at all confident” to 7 = “Extremely confident” they degree of confidence 
in their estimate of the premium.   
9. Pricing (20-year contract). Participants were asked to give “the minimum annual 
premium (excluding administrative costs)” that they would like to charge against the risk 
in a case where they could offer a “20-year insurance contract against the damage to the 
property that would be tied to the homeowner mortgage.”   
10. Confidence (20-year contract).  Participants were asked to give “the minimum annual 
premium (excluding administrative costs)” that they would like to charge against the risk 
in the 20-year contract case.   
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APPENDIX 2: INFORMATION ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR 
COMPANY 
This appendix provides descriptive statistics on our random sample of 80 U.S. insurers.  We 
had 52 answers from actuaries (65%), 3 answers from underwriters (3.75%), 7 answers from 
risk managers (8.75%), 5 answers from general managers (15%), and 13 answers (16.25%) 
from other jobs (product management, pricing management, analysts…).  With regard to past 
experience, 33.75% of our sample had less than 2 years of experience in their job, 44% had 
between 2 and 5 years of experience in their job, 13% had between 6 and 11 years of 
experience in their job, and 8.75% had more than 12 years of experience in their job.  Three 
(3) participants had a PhD (3.75%), and 2 participants (2.5%) had a high school degree as 
their highest degree.  80% of the participants (n=64) had a Bachelor’s degree as their highest 
degree, and 13.75% had a Master’s degree (n=11).  
 
Graph 1: Descriptive statistics – Random Sample of 80 U.S. insurers 
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On average, a majority of participants (56.25%) were working for a publicly-traded 
company and only 5 participants were working in a private company (see Graph 2). Among 
the remaining participants, 33.75% of the participants were working for a mutual, and 5% 
(n=4) did not know the type of company they were working for.  We had a majority of 
answers (51.25%) from large companies with a surplus between $5 and $10B; 25% of 
participants worked for a company having a surplus larger than $10B.  Two percent of the 
participants worked for a company having a surplus between $1 and $5B. Five percent of the 
participants did not answer the question.  In terms of number of employees, 68.5% of the 
participants reported working for a company having between 5,000 and 20,000 employees, 
5% were in companies with more than 20,000 employees, and 12.5% were in companies 
having between 1,000 and 5,000 employees (11.25% did not provide the number of 
employees of their company).   
 
 
Graph 2: Characteristics of the companies 
